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SOCIAL SCIENTISTS have recognized that legislatures are com-
plex institutions in which formal written or verbalized rules
are not the only dictates of proper behavior. Many scholars
have pointed out that certain informal rules or norms may
have even a greater influence upon behavioral expectations
than do articulated guidelines. One political science study defines
legislative norms as "widely shared sets of beliefs regarding
appropriate behavior for legislators as legislators where these
beliefs are not only shared but believed to be shared by legisla-
tors and are supported by social mechanisms encouraging con-
formity." Certainly the concept of legislative norms applies to
one of America's most esteemed political institutions, the U.S.
Senate, and there "social mechanisms encouraging conformi-
ty" may hinder the senator who flouts such norms. The stormy
political career of self-confessed Republican insurgent Smith
W. Brookhart, who served as a U.S. senator from Iowa in the
1920s, illustrates some of the limitations to dissent which legis-
lative norms can construct in the Senate.^
One influential study enumerates Senate "folkways," those
unarticulated forces which combine to enforce group pressure.
The first rule of Senate behavior is that "new members are
expected to serve a proper apprenticeship." Senatorial adher-
ence to an unobstructive apprenticeship is essential for future
effectiveness in the institution. In addition, institutional folk-
1. F. Ted Herbert and Lelan E. McLemore, "Character and Structure of
Legislative Norms: Operationalizing the Norm Concept in the Legislative
Setting," American Journal of Political Science 17 (August 1973), 506-527,
quotations from p. 508.
56
Brookhart and Senatorial Dissent
ways require that senators devote most of their energies to
legislative routine rather than to publicity-seeking activities.
The effective senator is also to develop a legislative speciality
as one cannot reasonably deal with a wide range of complex
issues. Finally, senatorial folkways emphasize comradeship,
including such attributes as courtesy, to insure that political
disagreements do not influence personal feelings; reciprocity,
to encourage senators to assist each other whenever possible
by exchanging votes and support; and intense institutional
patriotism, to maintain morale. While senators' folkways are
necessary for the Senate to function as a lawmaking body,
they "are not universally accepted or adhered to; indeed there
is some covert hostility toward them in certain circles." Among
the factors which can influence a senator to accept or reject
Senate folkways are previous training and experience; political
ambition; a competitive two-party, or a large and complex,
constituency; and political ideology. Thus, a senator elected
"as a 'liberal' or 'progressive' or 'reformer' is under considera-
ble pressure to produce legislative results in a hurry. The peo-
ple who voted for him are not likely to be happy with small
favors—dams built, rivers dredged, roads financed—but want
major national legislative policy changed." A senator may well
disregard these influences toward nonconformity and adhere
to the Senate folkways, not necessarily from coercion, but
perhaps because the basis for evaluating a senator's effective-
ness is the ability to get one's bills passed. Senators who con-
form to the folkways get more of their proposed legislation
enacted. Thus, in the famous maxim of Sam Rayburn, "to get
along, you have to go along."^
Another study of Senate behavior contends that to be a
member of the "inner club" senators must give special consid-
eration to the institution's informal norms and procedures. The
effective senator is therefore a master of conciliation and an
advocate of institutional patriotism. Those that challenge Sen-
ate folkways and norms "are in the end influential only to the
degree that they may so instruct or so inflame a part of the
public sufficiently large to insist upon this or that course of
2. Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill, 1960),
92-117.
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political conduct. The Senate type in the last analysis has the
better of it. For not only does his forum generally resist change
and all public pressure save the massive and the enduring; it
also will tend quickly to adopt his proposals unless they are
quite clearly untenable." Thus the price paid for defying Sen-
ate norms may be legislative ineffectiveness. The Senate is,
however, basically a very tolerant institution reluctant to un-
dertake punitive measures against its members. It moved slowly
to censure Senator Joseph McCarthy for bringing the institu-
tion into dishonor and disrepute, for example. Open censure
is a departure from the Senate norms of more subtle coercion
and cooperation toward legislative effectiveness.^
A case study of Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire argues
that an alternative outsider role exists in the Senate for the
political maverick. Such individuals consciously choose to dis-
regard institutional norms which interfere with their ideologi-
cal and reelection goals. The Senate has even officially
acknowledged the historical importance of the outsider. A Sen-
ate committee formed in 1955 to designate five outstanding
historical members of the institution made Robert M. LaFol-
lette of Wisconsin one of its selections, thus recognizing the
liberal maverick in the annals of the Senate. Bills enacted may
be too narrow a test of legislative effectiveness, as the Senate
is not a place "where the individual members are paid on a
piece-work basis." The outsider's presentation of unpopular or
minority views contributes to the important process of conflict
resolution as well. Therefore "the behavior of the Senate type
who is in the Inner Club may be functional for groups who
benefit from preserving the status quo, dysfunctional for conflict
resolution in the larger society. The behavior associated with
the Outsider may be functional for protest groups seeking a
spokesman, dysfunctional for groups needing leverage inside
the legislative body." The outsider tends to look to a constitu-
ency and ideological allies for norms rather than to the other
members of the Senate, and historically Senate dissenters have
won reelection. They may be able to defy folkways and norms
because the Senate can be tolerant of individualistic behavior,
3. William S. White, Citadel: The Story of the U.S. Senate (New York, 1956),
88, 127.
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while "the imposition of censure or ostracism is a rare and
traumatic action reserved for really deviant behavior, borne a
long time." What constitutes "really deviant behavior," and
what causes Senate norms to come into play, however, remain
variable.*
A detailed examination of the turbulent political career of
Iowa Senator Smith W. Brookhart reveals some of the limita-
tions of senatorial dissent and the role which the outsider can
play. Brookhart was one senator who defied institutional folk-
ways and who apparently suffered Senate punishment for his
actions. In 1920 Brookhart opposed incumbent Senator Albert
B. Cummins in the Republican primary and lost, but in 1922
he won election to fill the unexpired term of Senator William
Kenyon who had retired from the Senate to accept a federal
judgeship. In 1924 Brookhart apparently won election to a full
term in the Senate, but the Republican caucus dismissed him
in 1925, and in 1926 the Senate overturned his victory. He
immediately retumed to Iowa, defeated Cummins in the Re-
publican primary, and returned to the Senate in November of
1926. His political career finally ended with defeat in the 1932
Republican primary.^
Brookhart's maverick style did not originate in the Senate.
Rebellion seemed to be part of his character as well as his
politics, and he delighted in telling reporters about his middle
name: "Wildman is a good name. It is my mother's name; it
is English. But is also notice to the stand-patters that I am one
Progressive who won't be tamed." He was born in Scotland
County, Missouri, on February 2,1869, allegedly in a log cabin.
His family moved to Iowa in 1879, and he attended Iowa
schools until he graduated from Southem Iowa Normal School
in 1889. He first earned his living by teaching, while he studied
law at night under the guidance of Dillon Payne, brother-in-
law of former Populist presidential candidate James B. Weaver.
After passing the state bar examination in 1892, Brookhart
4. Ralph K. Huitt, "The Outsider in the Senate: An Alternative Role,"
American Political Science Review 55 (Spring 1961), 566-575, quotations from
pp. 572-575.
5. For a detailed account of Brookhart's election activities in the 1920s see
Jerry A. Neprash, The Brookhart Campaignß in Iowa, 1920-1926 (New York,
1932).
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moved to Washington, Iowa, where he soon became active in
politics. He naturally adhered to the Republican party, which
was popular among Iowans who still identified with the legacy
of Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War, and many of whom
were G.A.R. veterans. Claiming that he was a prohibitionist
"from his mother's breast," Brookhart served three terms, from
1894 to 1900, as Washington County Attorney on a platform
dedicated to the enforcement of prohibition law.'
Brookhart next set his sights on a congressional seat, but,
unfortunately for his political prospects, he was unable to
reach an accommodation with Joseph W. Blythe. Blythe was
the political representative of the Burlington Railroad which
dominated politics in the First Congressional District. Brook-
hart maintained that he left Blythe's office "determined to fight
the railroads and drive them out of politics." He thus aligned
himself with the progressive forces of Governor Albert Cum-
mins. Yet this affiliation did not advance his political career,
as in 1910 he lost the Republican primary contest for the First
Congressional District. Frustrated in his political endeavors,
Brookhart turned to journalism, and purchased the Washington
County Press in December of 1911. As a progressive editor, he
announced in 1912 that he would vote for the Bull Moose
candidate, Theodore Roosevelt, but he would not join the
Progressive party as he believed Republicans could reform
their party to be progressivism's vehicle. Nevertheless, he gen-
erally downplayed the subject of party regularity: "The doc-
trine of standing by party if party is wrong, is dead."^
6. Ray Tucker and Frederick R. Barkley, Sons of the Wild Jackass (Boston,
1932), 344. While no biography of Brookhart exists, the most detailed ac-
cound of his life and career is Ray S. Johnston, "Smith Wildman Brookhart:
Iowa's Last Populist" (M.A. thesis. State University of Iowa, 1964). Brief but
useful overviews of Brookhart include Reinhard H. Luthin, "Smith Wildman
Brookhart of Iowa: Insurgent Agrarian Politician," Agricultural History 25
(October 1951), 187-197 and George William McDaniel, "Smith Wildman
Brookhart," Palimpsest 63 (September/October 1982), 175-183. See also George
William McDaniel, "Prohibition Debate in Washington County, 1890-1894:
Smith Wildman Brookhart's Introduction to Politics," Annals of Iowa 45
(Winter 1981), 519-536.
7. James B. Morrow, "A Hunter of Wall Street Devils," Nation's Business
12 (March 1923), 21-22; Washington County Press, 11 January 1912.
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BROOKHART first indicated that he was becoming restless as a
regular Republican in 1920 when he challenged his former
mentor Cummins in the Republican senatorial primary. Brook-
hart, along with organized labor in the state, was upset with
Cummins' sponsorship of the Esch-Cummins Act. This act
returned the railroads to private ownership after World War
I with what many farmers and laborers considered to be a too
generous guarantee of railroad profits. Brookhart argued that
the law was "a surrender of most of the reforms we have
fought for during the past twenty years." He seemed to as-
sume an outsider posture in this campaign. He portrayed Cum-
mins as a former progressive who had sold out to the railroads,
while Cummins controlled the party machinery so that he
could prevent Brookhart from speaking at the Republican state
convention. In a hotly contested primary. Cummins still pre-
vailed 115,768 to 96,563. In 1920, Iowa voters were not pre-
pared to send the message to the nation that they chose an
outsider as their representative.^
This spirit changed in 1922. Overexpansion of American
agriculture during World War I in response to the slogan "food
will win the war," and the postwar decline of European mar-
kets, contributed to a major agricultural depression in Iowa
and throughout America's farmland. Iowa began to feel the
impact of this depression in July of 1920, only one month after
Brookhart's defeat in the Republican primary. Land values had
risen spectacularly with the expectation that high farm in-
comes would continue throughout the 1920s. The percentage
of land mortgaged in the state rose from 38 percent in 1915 to
51 percent in 1924, while the debt per acre increased from
$54.00 in 1915 to the exorbitant figure of $100.00 per acre in
1921. The agricultural depression made payment of many mort-
gages impossible. Corn, the staple of Iowa farmers, declined
from a selling price of $1.20 per bushel in 1919 to a disastrous
$.30 per bushel by December 1921. This price collapse affected
almost all state farm commodities. In terms of income, grain
declined 53 percent; hogs, 39 percent; and cattle, 30 percent,
between September of 1920 and December of 1921. Governor
N. C. Kendall recognized the possible political repercussions
8. Washington Evening Journal, 31 March 1919.
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of the Iowa farmers' economic plight and complained to fellow
Iowan and Secretary of Agriculture Henry C. Wallace: "The
people of Iowa are wholly dissatisfled with existing conditions,
and unless substantial relief is afforded, the political revolu-
tion of 1920 will be remembered as a zephyr compared to the
tornado which will occur in 1922."'
Smith Brookhart was in a position to avail himself of the
political tornado which Governor Kendall predicted. On Janu-
ary 31, 1922, President Harding appointed Iowa Senator Wil-
liam Kenyon, the leader of the farm bloc, to a federal judgeship,
which gave Brookhart another opportunity to claim an Iowa
seat. Governor Kendall appointed Charles Rawson, the state
chairman of the Republican party, to replace Kenyon in the
Senate until November when elections could occur, on the
condition that Rawson would not be a candidate to succeed
himself. Brookhart and three more conservative opponents
were early entrants into the race for the Republican nomina-
tion. In the midst of the crisis, Brookhart emphasized economic
questions by proposing cooperative marketing, repeal of the
Esch-Cummins Act, changes in the Federal Reserve System
which he contended had been unfair to the farmer, and pay-
ment of a soldiers' bonus. Brookhart generally assaulted the
vested interests of wealth and what he termed "the non-parti-
san league of Wall Street." LaFollette's Magazine endorsed the
Iowa insurgent in glowing terms, as "a man of sterling charac-
ter and splendid ability. The frank declaration of his platform
upon the issues of the day reflect [sic] his life-long service to
the cause of the common people." Brookhart appeared to be
constituency-oriented like LaFoUette, willing to play the alter-
9. For the most detailed secondary account of the agricultural crisis con-
sult U.S. Congress, The Agricultural Crisis and Its Causes: Report of the Joint
Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, House Report 408, 67th Cong., 1st sess.,
1921. For the impact of the agricultural depression on Iowa see Leland L.
Sage, "Rural Iowa in the 1920s and 1930s: Roots of the Farm Depression,"
Annals of Iowa 47 (Fall 1983), 91-103; Dorothy Schwieder, "Rural Iowa in the
1920s: Conflict and Continuity," Annals of Iowa 47 (Fall 1983), 104-115; and
loseph F. Wall, "The Iowa Farmer in Crisis, 1920-1936," Annals of Iowa 47
(Fall 1983), 116-127. For statistical information see Earle D. Ross, Iowa Agri-
culture (Iowa City, 1951), 153-154; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricul-
tural Yearbook, 1922 (Washington, D.C, 1923), 574. See also N. C. Kendall to
Henry C. Wallace, 17 lune 1921, General Records of the Department of
Agriculture, Record Group 16, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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native role of the outsider and present unpopular or minority
views necessary for conflict resolution.^"
Despite the favorable economic climate for a protest candi-
date, Brookhart was clearly worried about his electoral pros-
pects. He wrote to LaFoUette for aid in gaining the Iowa Farm
Bureau's support and warned: "Thirty-flve percent of the vote
is required to nominate. The plan of the other side is to bring
out so many candidates I will not get the 35%." If no candidate
surpassed the all-important 35 percent plateau, the Republican
state convention would decide the nomination, and there the
political outsider would have little chance of achieving party
endorsement. Brookhart's fears seemed realized when Clifford
M. Thome, his former supporter and a foe of the railroads,
made a late entry into the race. Dante M. Pierce, publisher of
the Iowa Homestead, complained that Thome's sole purpose
was to divide the progressive farm vote and deny Brookhart
the nomination. Pierce called Thome a Judas and a tool of Wall
Street. Brookhart, meanwhile, asserted that all of his oppo-
nents were reactionaries. "They are like a can of fish worms,
all scrambling to dig in and crawl out of sight, but they are all
bait for the same hook—the nonpartisan league of Wall Street,"
he proclaimed."
The strategy of Brookhart versus the field apparently worked
as the insurgent shocked many observers who had assumed
that the party convention would settle the nomination. Brook-
hart gained 41 percent of the vote, while Thome ran a distant
second. Brookhart's advocacy on behalf of disgruntled farmers
had brought his additional support in the cash-grain areas of
northwestern Iowa, and he had retained his labor backing. Of
the eleven Iowa counties in which he showed the greatest vote
increase over 1920, seven were in the cash-grain region. Iowa
10. For an examination of the politics in Kenyon's nomination see Robert
K. Murray, The Harding Era (Minneapolis, 1969), 217. See also Des Moines
Register, 19 April 1922; "Iowa and the U.S. Senate," LaFoUette's Magazine
(April 1922), 55, as cited in "Speeches and Writings" file, Robert M. LaFol-
lette, Sr. Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter file name,
LaFollette, Sr. Papers).
11. Smith W. Brookhart to Robert M. LaFollette, Sr., 1 March 1922, "Special
Correspondence," LaFollette, Sr. Papers; Iowa Homestead, 11 May 1922, as
cited in "Special Correspondence: Dante M. Pierce," LaFollette, Sr. Papers;
Des Moines Register, 23 May 1922.
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farmers were in revolt. But Brookhart's candidacy remained an
anathema to the state Republican party, and the old guard in
control of the August convention repudiated Brookhart by
enacting an almost reactionary platform. It endorsed Cummins
while ignoring Brookhart, asked for a repeal of the primary
law, and included a provision which criticized demagogues
who encouraged class conflict, an obvious reference to Brook-
hart. It was all the state chairman and Senator Rawson could
do to prevent the platform committee from endorsing the Esch-
Cummins Act.^ ^
Brookhart surprised some of his supporters by turning the
other cheek when the party convention snubbed him. He made
light of this treatment claiming, "in fact, the Republican con-
vention had so much confidence in me and were so satisfied
with my record that they wouldn't even take the time to listen
to me. They thought it would be a waste of valuable time."
Brookhart apparently valued the party label in 1922 in the
solid Republican state of Iowa. Yet while he stayed in the party
fold, some Republicans refused to support him. By October 16,
however,. Dante M. Pierce informed LaFollette that the party
bolt in Iowa was defused. Pierce did "not mean to say there
will not be Republican votes against Brookhart, but for every
Republican vote he loses he will get three Democratic votes."
Pierce's prediction was not far wrong, as Brookhart swept by
his Democratic opponent Clyde Herring with a majority of
over 160,000 votes."
Although Brookhart won election as a Republican, the na-
tional press was quick to perceive his victory as the elevation
to national office of a man who would play political outsider
in Washington to champion the cause of his rural constituency.
Current Opinion said Brookhart would enter the Senate "to
represent a constituency whose usual garb is overalls and cow-
hide boots, in the effort to get for these downtrodden and
uncoddled elements the legislation necessary for their welfare
12. Corwin D. Cornell, "Smith W. Brookhart and Agrarian Discontent in
Iowa" (M.A. thesis. University of Iowa, 1949); Des Moines Register, 3 August
1922.
13. Des Moines Register, 24 August 1922; Dante M. Pierce to Robert M.
LaFollette, Sr., 16 October 1922, "Special Correspondence: Dante M. Pierce,"
LaFollette, Sr. Papers.
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and not to attend teas and dances." The New York Times ridi-
culed Brookhart's victory and the distressed farmers' plea for
government relief as "the result of that combination of selfish
interests against the common interest which has been lamen-
tably illustrated of late in Washington." With commodity prices
continuing to decline, the farm press, however, was not liable
to see the ôowa election as a manifestation of selfish interests
drinking at the public trough. The Prairie Farmer editorialized
that farmers who elected Brookhart, or other mavericks such
as Lynn J. Frazier of North Dakota and Henrik Shipstead of
Minnesota, to the Senate in 1922 were not irrational. They
were sending a message to the Harding administration that
they were growing restive without a positive government re-
sponse to their distress. The Prairie Farmer concluded: "the
farmers aren't going red, nor are the rest of the folks who
helped spill the beans election day. They want some place to
sell their corn, and they don't like the price of coal. That's
about all there is to it. They believe a few men in Washington
who could see over the Allegheny mountains might help."
Farmers were not seeking representatives who would master
the folkways and norms of the Senate, but those who would
"raise hell" and draw attention to their plight: in short, the
outsiders.'*
Established interests could still hope that Brookhart, like
many other champions of the people's interests, would recant
on his campaign promises and style once he reached the Sen-
ate. Senate leaders, suspicious of the Iowa insurgent, also tried
to muzzle Brookhart through his committee assignments. They
appointed him to low-prestige committees: Claims, Education
and Labor, Interoceanic Canals, Manufactures, and Military
Affairs. These committees did not represent major federal
government concerns in the 1920s. In his electoral campaign
Brookhart had primarily addressed himself to the problems of
agriculture and exorbitant transportation rates, but these as-
signments had little to do with such issues. To conform to
Senate practice, Brookhart should have assumed an unob-
14. "Congress Has a Shouting Progressive in Brookhart of Iowa," Current
Opinion 74 (May 1923), 538; New York Times, 8 June 1922; Prairie Farmer, 18
November 1922.
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structive apprenticeship by accepting these assignments and
limiting his activities to areas of legislation within the jurisdic-
tion of these committees. Such dedication to Senate norms
would supposedly result later in better appointments after
Brookhart had completed his apprenticeship."
Brookhart preferred to defy Senate norms. He had little
choice. A disgruntled rural constituency, which felt that the
national government had ignored it, elected him to air its
plight, good and loud. Brookhart had only two years in which
to gain this attention as he would have to face reelection in
1924. The immediacy of another Brookhart campaign was evi-
dent to Dante M. Pierce, as he asked that prototypical outsider,
Robert LaFollette, to help Brookhart get accustomed to the
Senate and the Washington political scene: "I would feel more
sanguine about the situation if he had been elected for a six
year term rather than two years and three months, but I have
confidence in his ability to handle himself so that he can be
returned in two years." With the time constraints on Brookhart
to draw attention to his rural electorate's problems, his admir-
ers expected him to promptly challenge Senate folkways and
assume the role of what Austin Haines in the Nation would call
"the Dissenter." "Colonel Brookhart is the voice of discontent,
in the hearts of Iowa farmers and organized labor," Haines
asserted, "against wrongs which they believe they have suffered
at the hands of the present administration. He is an indefatiga-
ble worker, firm to the point of stubbornness, a hard hitter,
who takes himself with the utmost seriousness, and has not a
particle of fear in his make-up."'*
Brookhart lost little time. One of his first actions in the
Senate was to help block consideration of President Harding'«
pet project, a ship subsidy, in order to obtain attention for
agricultural relief measures. Needless to say, such disregard
for the Republican president's desires by a freshman senator
of the party did not sit well with the Republican majority in
the Senate. The New York Times, close to many key Republican
15. Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 1923-1924, 65:156.
16. Dante M. Pierce to Robert M. LaFollette, Sr., 14 November 1922,
"Special Correspondence: Dante M. Pierce," LaFollette, Sr. Papers; Arthur
Haines, "Smith W. Brookhart, Dissenter," Nation 115 (November 1, 1922),
467.
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sources, ridiculed Brookhart's activities: "In almost the same
breath, he shudders at a subsidy for the merchant marine and
demands a subsidy for the never-enough-to-be-prized-and-
privileged farmers." But Brookhart was no fool. Neither Presi-
dent Harding nor Republican senators would be among those
reelecting him in 1924. He needed the support of agrarian
rather than maritime interests and the ship subsidy was not
popular back on the farm. The Prairie Farmer editorialized that
the government should put it aside until agricultural relief was
available. "Prosperous, contented farmers are of more impor-
tance to the nation's welfare in peace and its safety in war than
all the ships we can build," reminded the Prairie Farmer.^''
Brookhart's opposition to the ship subsidy was not an aber-
ration. The freshman senator continued to speak out on a wide
range of issues. He vigorously assailed the Esch-Cummins Act
and its guarantee of a 6 percent return on railroad investments
as unfair to the farmers of America. Brookhart maintained that
"the guarantying of a half billion dollars to 8,000 millionaires
to keep full the measure of their war profits is a wise, business-
like, conservative, and patriotic use of the Public Treasury, but
the guarantying of the cost of production to 7,000,000 farmers
for a crop produced at the command of their government at the
oppressive cost of war prices is unwise, socialistic, and trea-
sonable." Brookhart's diatribes against Esch-Cummins often
took on a very bitter and personal tone which seemed to flout
the Senate norms of courtesy and reciprocity. After all, the
act's sponsor was the well-respected president pro tempore
and powerful chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commit-
tee, the senior senator from Iowa, Albert Cummins. Brookhart
also ignored the folkway of legislative specialization. He pro-
posed an excess profits tax and increased taxation for the
wealthy, and demanded farmer representation on the Federal
Reserve Board. He argued that the board was responsible for
the deflation and price collapse of 1920 and yet agriculture,
which furnished 40 percent of the nation's bank deposits, had
no representation on it. But these were not concerns directly
relevant to his committee assignments.^*
17. New York Times, 20 December 1923; Prairie Farmer, 1 December 1922.
18. Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th sess., 1922, 64:621; Congressional
Record, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 1924, 65:1,083, 8,025-8,027. Some historians
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COOPERATIVE marketing was Brookhart's panacea for the plight
of American agriculture, and he loved to educate his listeners
on his favorite subject. He observed that cooperatives were
"more enterprising than private business; they are more pro-
gressive;- they are more philanthropic; they do everything in
the spirit of the advancement of human civilization better than
the corporations ever have done anywhere in the world." This
admiration for the cooperative system often antagonized Brook-
hart's colleagues and made him «he subject of political contro-
versy and publicity. In February of 1923, he suggested in a
New York speech that Congress prohibit all interstate com-
merce not conducted under federal charter and the cooperative
movement. Senator Irving Lenroot of Wisconsin labeled this
proposal as class legislation similar to that of the Russian Bol-
sheviks. Lenroot charged that not even Lenin would think of
advocating such a plan. Comparison with Lenin would be-
come familiar to Brookhart, especially after he returned from
a journey to Russia, made ostensibly to investigate the cooper-
ative movement there. Again violating the norm against fresh-
man senators seeking publicity, Brookhart was certain to gain
attention when he claimed the Soviet government was stable
and had "abandoned the communistic plan for that of the
cooperative." He called upon Secretary of State Charles Evans
Hughes to extend American recognition to the Soviet Union
and immediately provoked a shower of criticism. Senator Cum-
mins declared, "If his powers were commensurate with his
apparent desires, the government would not last a fortnight."^'
In addition to breaking with the Senate folkways of no
publicity seeking, freshman inactivity, and legislative special-
ization, Brookhart did not develop a sense of comradeship
with many of his colleagues. He chastised Senator David A.
have challenged the assertions which farm representatives such as Brook-
hart made against the Federal Reserve Board. For a refutation of Bookhart's
views see Arthur S. Link, "The Federal Reserve Policy and the Agricultural
Depression of 1920-1921," Agricultural History 20 üuly 1946), 166-175.
19. Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th sess., 1922, 64:2,766; New York
Times, 2 February, 19 July 1923; Des Moines Register, 18 July 1923. For more
detailed examinations of Brookhart's journey to Russia see Ronald F. Briley,
"Smith W. Brookhart and Russia," Annals of Iowa 42 (Winter 1975), 541-556
and Smith Wildman Brookhart, "What I Really Saw and Learned in Europe
in 1923," Saturday Evening Post 202 (15 March 1930), 23,165-169.
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Reed of Pennsylvania for expressing ignorance about the farm
bloc, and warned Reed that if he did not learn more of their
plight, the farmers of Pennsylvania would soon find someone
to replace him in the Senate. An avid prohibitionist, Brookhart
also publicly lectured his colleagues on their drinking habits;
he charged flasks containing alcoholic beverages were in evi-
dence at many Washington parties. Such allegations would
certainly never make Brookhart a member of the "inner club."2°
Smith Brookhart, because of constituency concerns and the
desire for reelection, had chosen to fill the role of outsider in
the Senate. In his legislative activities and publicity seeking he
had been true to his campaign rhetoric of 1922. "I belong to
the farmer class. I have never risen above it. I have no ambition
to rise above it. I have a feeling of the deepest class conscious-
ness I am opposed to arraying class against class, but I am
a thousand times more opposed to arraying class over class,"
Brookhart proclaimed. With him in the Senate, farmers had an
advocate who made sure their voice of protest was heard. This
type of behavior received no formal reactions from the Senate
other than considerable complaining and personal criticism.
Normally, only the voters of Iowa could render an electoral
verdict on Brookhart's defiance of legislative norms. In his
1924 reelection campaign, however, Brookhart faced a contro-
versy that would allow his fellow senators to pass judgment
on him.^i
Initially Brookhart's strategy seemed successful. He easily
won renonünation as the Republican senatorial candidate. Again
the Republican state convention ignored him, and moreover,
in an obvious reference to Brookhart, the delegates adopted a
resolution which condemned socialists and demagogues. This
time the maverick Republican refused to bear such slights
silently and he pushed his insurgency beyond the bounds
which many Iowans could accept. Robert LaFollette's third-
party presidential candidacy, which Brookhart predicted would
carry the state by 150,000 votes, encouraged Brookhart while
reports that Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon had
20. Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th sess., 1923, 64:2,771; Tucker and
Barkley, Sons of the Wild Jackass, 360-361.
21. Des Moines Register, 5 September 1922.
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intervened to deny Iowan William Kenyon the Republican
vice-presidential nomination angered him. So Brookhart de-
cided to challenge the Republican party leadership. On Octo-
ber 1,1924, in a public letter to William Butler, chairman of the
Republican National Committee, Brookhart demanded resig-
nation from the Republican vice-presidential nominee Charles
G. Dawes and called for a different candidate of a more pro-
gressive vein. He followed this outcry with a speech on Octo-
ber 3 in Emmetsburg, Iowa, in which he declared: "I belong
to the farm bloc. President Coolidge belongs to the Wall Street
bloc." Brookhart maintained that the state Republican conven-
tion, which the "Coolidge machine" had dominated, had
snubbed and insulted him. Furthermore, while he continued
to carry forth the traditional Republican principles of Lincoln,
Roosevelt, and Kenyon, reactionary forces, contrary to the true
nature of Republicanism, had gained control of the party. The
"issue has now arisen in Iowa as to whether the principles of
the Republican Party shall be determined by the voters them-
selves or by a small group of crooked and irresponsible dic-
tators set up by the nonpartisan league of Wall Street." His
rural constituency had allowed Brookhart to question Senate
norms; now he hoped it would support his challenge to party
discipline.^^
Although his repudiation of Coolidge was not an automatic
endorsement of LaFollette's candidacy, the LaFollette head-
quarters in Iowa did book Brookhart's speeches for the dura-
tion of the campaign. The Republican State Central Comniittee
reacted to Brookhart's actions by withdrawing organized sup-
port for his candidacy. The committee maintained that Brook-
hart had bolted the party at the LaFollette camp's urging as
part "of a conspiracy to defeat the right of the people to elect
a President at the polls, and to force such an election by a
Congress selected two to six years ago." Many Republican
newspapers in the state advised their readers to vote for the
Democratic candidate, Daniel Steck, by publishing sample bal-
22. Des Moines Register, 13 June, 23 July 1924; Senate Committee on
Privileges and Elections, Senator from Iowa: Hearings Before a Subcommittee
on Privileges and Elections on Senate Resolution 21, 69th Cong., 1st sess.,
1925-1926, 72, 99-101 (hereafter Committee on Privileges & Elections, num-
ber).
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lots with an arrow drawn to Steck's name. Brookhart overesti-
mated both LaFoUette's appeal and the radicalism of Iowa
voters. Contrary to many predictions, LaFollette lost Iowa's
electoral votes; they remained in the Republican column. A
temporary increase in farm prices, the Iowa voter's traditional
Republicanism, opposition from the Republican Service League,
and LaFoUette's continuing emphasis on the somewhat out-
dated cause of fighting monopolies, all contributed to the Wis-
consin progressive's failure. In his senatorial contest, Brookhart
was victorious by the very slim margin of approximately seven
hundred votes. His party "bolt" had evidently alienated Re-
publican voters who had remained loyal throughout his highly
irregular conduct in the Senate."
Republicans in the Senate, who had suffered through two
years of Brookhart's antics without applying sanctions, voted
to exclude Brookhart, along with LaFollette and Senators Lynn
J. Frazier and Edwin P. Ladd of North Dakota, from further
party conferences, in addition to withdrawing their committee
appointments. Being read out of the senatorial Republican
party proved to be only the beginning of Brookhart's difficul-
ties. Steck, the defeated Democratic senatorial candidate, peti-
tioned the Senate to chaUenge Brookhart's election. The body
referred the petition to the Committee on Privileges and Elec-
tion for hearings. In his complaint. Steck argued that under
Section Five, Article One of the Constitution each house of
Congress "shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its own members." He maintained that many
voters placed an "X" on the Republican column and then drew
an arrow to Steck's name in the Democratic column. Although
the ballots were marked inaccurately according to Iowa elec-
tion law. Steck asserted that the committee should strictly
endorse the intent of the voters. B. B. Burnquist, chairman of
the Republican party in Iowa, also filed a complaint which
contested Brookhart's election. According to Burnquist, the
23. Committee on Privileges & Elections, 102-103. For an extensive exami-
nation of the LaFollette campaign see Kenneth MacKay, The Progressive
Movement of 1924 (New York, 1947). For the role of the Republican Service
League see George W. McDaniel, "Over Here: The Mobilization of the Re-
publican Service League to Defeat Smith Wildman Brookhart" (M.A. essay.
University of Iowa, 1977) and New York Times, 18 April 1926.
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senator had claimed to be a Republican until his Emmetsburg
speech, when he openly repudiated the Republican party, and
it was then too late to remove Brookhart's name from the
ballot. Burnquist claimed that Brookhart had attempted to de-
fraud the Republican voters of Iowa by denying them a candi-
date. Burnquist concluded his protest with a bombastic flourish:
"Never have the voters been so shamefully and unfairly be-
trayed. Never before has the entire membership of a political
party been disfranchised. The false pretense and deception of
the incumbent has shocked the people of Iowa and the
nation."^*
In response to these allegations, Brookhart insisted that his
election had been fair according to Iowa law. He had cam-
paigned on the platform which the state Republican conven-
tion had adopted and was a Republican true to the historical
principles of Lincoln and Roosevelt, while the State Central
Committee had repudiated the party platform and conspired
to defeat him. He again enunciated his constituency orienta-
tion: "he [hadj announced his platform distinctly and definitely
upon every issue and [hadJ submitted it openly to the Republi-
can voters of Iowa." Brookhart's arguments did not persuade
the Committee on Privileges and Elections; it voted ten to one
to uphold Steck's petition and unseat Brookhart. The commit-
tee's chairman, Richard P. Ernst of Kentucky, denied that the
committee had decided the issue politically. It had counted
ballots for Steck, which while inaccurately marked according
to Iowa election law had nevertheless shown intent to vote for
the Democratic candidate, and these votes gave Steck a major-
ity in the election. Ernest did concede that many Iowans
scratched their Republican votes for Steck in response to the
campaign efforts of the Republican state organization and press
in Iowa. The voters of Iowa intended to punish Brookhart for
his part "bolt."«
Despite Ernst's assertions that political and personal consid-
erations were not part of the committee's decision, some evi-
dence suggests otherwise. For example, Arkansas Senator T.
24. Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 2nd sess., 1925,66:1,285; Committee
on Privileges & Elections, 1, 38.
25. Committe on Privileges & Elections, 41; Congressional Record, 69th
Cong., 1st sess., 1926, 67:6,950.
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H. Caraway's opening remarks in the Senate chamber on the
Brookhart-Steck question revealed the pressures at work.
There has been propaganda going the rounds of the Senate. Its
propriety I shall not undertake to discuss. One party to the
contest has gone to every Senator on this floor personally and
set out his views. He has gone not only one time, but, I presume,
every Senator on the floor has been approached many times and
had that party to this contest state what his views are and what
he claims his rights were. There has been constant propaganda.
I myself was subjected to it. I do not personally know what
propriety demands. I do know that the other party to this contest
has never gone to a single member of the body, as far as my
information goes—I know it is true so far as I am individually
concerned—he has never suggested one thing that should be
done or should not be done in determining this contest. In fact
so particular was he that he never, as I understand, was intro-
duced to a single member of the Senate. Which was the course
that propriety ought to suggest? I am going to leave each Senator
to be his own judge.
Thus Caraway reminded his colleagues of Brookhart's aggres-
sive behavior and flouting of Senate norms."
MIDWESTERN progressives and some southern Democrats de-
fended Brookhart. Cole Blease of South Carolina asserted that
unseating Brookhart would be a violation of states' rights.
Blease argued, "If he has come here wrongly, four years from
now the people of Iowa will pass on that and our hands will
be clean." Many Senators most wanted to hear the views of the
senior senator and president pro tempore, Albert Cummins. In
reply to allegations that he was behind the move to unseat
Brookhart, who had long been a thorn in his side. Cummins
insisted that the Senate should decide the contest on its merits.
Cummins persisted: "I have not attempted, either directly or
indirectly, by discussion, suggestion, inference, or any other
manner to influence any Senator with regard to this contest."
While he certainly had reason to view favorably the abrasive
Brookhart's departure from the Senate, such a turn of events
26. Congressional Record, ibid., 6,860.
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would be a mixed blessing for Cummins, as an unseated Brook-
hart would probably return to Iowa and challenge him in the
1926 primaries.^^
With Cummins abstaining, sixteen Republicans joined twenty-
nine Democrats to award the contested Iowa seat to the Demo-
crat, Daniel Steck. The Republican party would maintain a
fifteen-seat majority without the troublesome Brookhart. He
had defied Senate folkways and had assumed the role of a
political outsider; accordingly, he had accumulated little per-
sonal collateral with his colleagues. As journalists Ray Tucker
and Frederick Barkley concluded. Republicans "preferred a
conservative Democrat to a radical Republican." The New York
Times, never a great admirer of Brookhart, bid good riddance
to him and praised the Senate action: "In any event, he has had
a severe lesson, and party discipline will be strengthened by
the exclusion of a Senator who flouted the very party of which
he sought the support." George Norris, who became the leader
of the Senate progressives after Robert LaFollette died in 1925,
also asserted that Brookhart's progressive position cost him his
Senate seat. He informed N. Baker of Muscatine that after an
honest election, the Senate illegally threw Brookhart out of
office under the manipulations of Massachusetts Senator Wil-
liam Butler, chairman of the Republican National Committee.
Norris concluded, "I think it is well known that quite a number
of Senators voted against Brookhart without giving any con-
sideration whatsoever to the evidence." Norris endorsed Brook-
hart's decision to return to Iowa and confront Cummins in the
June primary.^^
The New York Times termed the Brookhart-Cummins contest
as a confrontation between "a tried and true Coolidge Republi-
can" and "a LaFollette progressive." The election was to be a
litmus test of administration support in the Midwest. Unfortu-
nately for Cummins, farm prices in Iowa had again dropped,
following a temporary increase in the presidential election
year of 1924. Wheat which sold for $1.30 a bushel in 1924 had
27. Ibid., 5,824, 7,246.
28. Tucker and Barkley, Sons of the Wild Jackass, 364; New York Times, 11
April 1926; George W. Norris to N. Baker, 17 May 1926, "Brookhart Contest
in Iowa" file, George W. Norris Papers, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C. (hereafter Norris Papers).
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dropped to $1.20 per bushel, while corn had slumped drastical-
ly from $.98 per bushed in 1924 to $.64 in 1926. As farm condi-
tions worsened, Iowa farmers clamored for passage of the
McNary-Haugen bill which would guarantee parity prices for
agriculture behind the wall of a protective tariff. But Calvin
Coolidge opposed the legislation as price fixing and as an
unwarranted government intrusion into business.^'
In addition to his identification with an increasingly unpop-
ular Coolidge, Cummins had to deal with many observers'
impression that, while he had become a Senate insider, he had
lost touch with his constituents. Thus George Norris praised
his colleague as "one of the most able men in the United
States," but regretted that Cummins had slipped away from
the progressive cause and had gone over to the opposition.
"When a man of the ability and the power of Senator Cum-
mins can be led away from the moorings by the flattery and
the alluring inducement of high society, what can you expect
of the ordinary person?" Norris lamented. Even Cummins'
supporters recognized that he had a problem. Constituent M.
W. Fitz wrote to Iowa Congressman L. J. Dickinson that Cum-
mins "must turn his head from Easternism or he will be too
late to save Iowa from the calamity which it is approaching
and [from] Brookhartism, into which we will be so deeply
buried, that there will be no reserection [sic] of the Real Repub-
lican party." Other Iowans found the spread of Brookhartism
a pleasing prospect. E. B. Goss, head of the Com Growers'
Association in Greene County, took Secretary of Agriculture
William Jardine to task for the administration's opposition to
farm relief: "Do you dare think that you can cram some of your
stuff down the farmers' throats and they not come back at you
in the polls? Is Brookhart losing out, come to Iowa and see."3°
While Jardine did not have to come to Iowa "and see,"
29. New York Times, 13 April 1926; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Year-
book of Agriculture, 1926 (Washington, D.C, 1927), 804, 834. For an in-depth
study of the McNary-Haugen bill see Gilbert C. Fite, George N. Peek and the
Fight for Farm Parity (Norman, 1954). A poll by the Des Moines Register, 8
May 1924, showed 926 Iowans in favor of the plan with only 183 opposed.
30. George W. Norris to J. A. Lister, 24 June 1926, Norris Papers; M. W. Fitz
to L. J. Dickinson, 9 November 1925, General Records of the Department of
Agriculture, Record Group 16, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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Brookhart did return to the state in 1926, with a new campaign
issue which the Senate had handed to him. Cummins had not
spoken out when the Senate ignored Iowa election law, and
so deprived Iowa voters, through political manipulation, of
their legally elected representative. Cummins basically cam-
paigned from Washington, while Brookhart "lizzied" into every
county, gave sometimes as many as fifteen speeches in a day,
and worked until midnight most evenings. He refused to apol-
ogize for any of his actions in Washington and promised to
continue his aggressive tactics on behalf of farm legislation. He
concluded his speeches with the refrain, "I told the truth and
they kicked me out." Agrarian discontent with Cummins, and
Brookhart's strategy of running as an outsider against the Sen-
ate, contributed to an impressive victory for Brookhart, who
outpoUed Cummins by over 17 percent of the 420,000 votes
cast in the primary. Brookhart's was the triumph of a constitu-
ency-oriented outsider over a well-respected member of the
Senate inner club who followed institutional folkways and
norms. After this victory, however, Brookhart took care not to
test the Iowa electorate's norm of Republican voting. The party
even appeared to make some overtures to Brookhart; for the
first time he was asked to deliver a speech at the state party
convention. Yet when Cummins died on July 30, Brookhart
was not the party's choice to nil the unexpired short session
of Cummins' term. This time he did not reply to the party
snubbing, but retained his Republican label and rolled to an
easy win over his Democratic opponent. He seemed to go out
of his way to avoid reminding voters of his 1924 flirtation with
the LaFollette campaign. Robert M. LaFollette, Jr. wrote to Ira
Lorenz that, "as the matter now stands, I am not going to assist
in the Brookhart campaign. This for your own confidential
information. Although I was ready and wUling to go, Brook-
hart and his managers decided that my coming would not be
helpful to him." With the senior LaFollette dead, Brookhart
saw no reason to utilize the son and raise the ghosts of past
31. New York Times, 13 June 1926; Neprash, Brookhart Campaigns in Iowa,
57; Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., to Ira Lorenz, 26 May 1926, "Personal Corre-
spondence, 1926" file, Robert M. LaFollette, Jr. Papers, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.
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Reassuming his position in the Senate, Brookhart continued
to serve as a vocal spokesman for the cause of agriculture.
While still in the legislative capacity of an outsider, Brookhart
did remain a regular Republican in the presidential campaign
of 1928, and endorsed Herbert Hoover's candidacy even though
the Democratic platform included a plank favorable to the
principles of McNary-Haugenism. The New York Times main-
tained that Brookhart had learned the lesson of party disci-
pline from the voters in 1924 and from the Senate in 1926. The
Times believed Brookhart was "pacified, tame and regular."
While certainly the legacy of the 1924 election may have had
some effect on Brookhart, as an ardent prohibitionist he would
not have been favorably disposed toward Hoover's opponent,
the "wet" AI Smith. Brookhart also shared with Hoover a
native Iowan's heritage and an adherence to the principles of
cooperative marketing in their approach to the farm problem.^^
During Hoover's presidency, agricultural conditions contin-
ued to deteriorate and, in 1932, Brookhart's senatorial career
would again depend on the voters, the ultimate test for the
outsider. Elder progressive statesman George Norris endorsed
Brookhart's reelection. Norris wrote to farm spokesman and
radio personality Henry Field urging him not to enter the
Republican primary and thus split the progressive vote. Norris
referred to Brookhart as "courageous and active" in the inter-
ests of agriculture. In reply. Field agreed that Brookhart had
indeed been a vocal proponent of agrarian discontent but he
questioned the Iowa senator's legislative effectiveness: "But
the complaint is that he had accomplished nothing whatsoever
with his legislative prosials [sic]. They admire you because you
have accomplished something, but Senator Brookhart hasn't
seemed to put his proposals over." Norris tried to dissuade
Field. He pointed out that the progressive group in the Senate
had opposed President Hoover on agricultural policy, which
incurred the wrath of the regular element in the Republican
32. Smith W. Brookhart, "The Plight of the Farmer," Nation 111 (April 7,
1926), 367-368; New York Times, 4 luly 1928; Gilbert C. Fite, "The Agricultural
Issue in the Presidential Campaign of 1928," Mississippi Valley Historical
Review 37 (March 1951), 653-672; Gary H. Koerselman, "Secretary Hoover
and National Farm Policy: Problems of Leadership," Agricultural History 51
(April 1977), 378-395.
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party, an element which "uses all the means known to political
machines to defeat us." The progressives were a small minori-
ty confronting the vast forces of vested wealth. "Our fights are
made against the same odds, and we meet defeat necessarily
oftener than we obtain a victory." Norris confirmed that non-
conformist senators deserved measurement by a different yard-
stick that that used to judge the cooperative majority. They
might not be effective with their own legislation but could
speak for underrepresented interests and further the process
of conflict resolution.^^
In 1922, to some extent in 1924, and in 1926 the Iowa elector-
ate had selected Brookhart as its senator because he would
aggressively draw attention to farm distress. By 1932, however,
Iowans were apparently growing impatient and demanded
results. Field defeated Brookhart in the Republican primary,
but Franklin Roosevelt's Democratic landslide swept away the
Republican stronghold of Iowa and Field lost as well. Merely
publicizing agrarian difficulties rather than legislatively solv-
ing them no longer satisfied Iowa voters and they banished the
flamboyant Brookhart to private life. Although he became an
FDR supporter, Brookhart was never able to adjust to the crop
reduction programs of the New Deal. He maintained at one
point that for the government to carry out a program of acre-
age restriction it would be necessary to kill off at least 20
percent of the farm population. He never again held an elec-
tive public office and, except for a brief stint as a Special Trade
Adviser on Russia for the Department of Agriculture, he re-
mained in private law practice until his death in 1944.3*
Examination of Smith Brookhart's political career lends cre-
dence to the idea that a senator may circumscribe Senate norms
and folkways successfully by interpreting the senatorial role
in terms of policy and constituency rather than institutional
goals. Brookhart was not concerned with his reputation in the
Senate as long as he could hold forth on the virtues of coopera-
tive marketing and satisfy the Iowa electorate. Brookhart's
career also provides an interesting illustration of the limita-
33. George W. Norris to Henry Field, 11, 16 April 1932, Henry Field to
George Norris, 13 April 1932, Norris Papers.
34. John D. Hicks and Theodore Saloutos, Twentieth Century Populism:
Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West, 1900-1939 (Madison, 1951), 419.
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tions of senatorial sanctions. The Senate took no official action
against Brookhart for his irregular conduct during his first
term, but from 1924 to 1926, when an opportunity arose to
express its disapproval of the Iowan, the Senate was not reluc-
tant to deny Brookhart committee assignements and, finally,
his seat in the chamber. The Senate will apply sanctions, but
such action takes place only under somewhat extraordinary
circumstances. Both the Iowa voters and the Senate had little
patience for Brookhart's flirtation with the LaFollette cam-
paign, which suggests that party regularity may be a more
important legislative norm than some political scientists have
believed it to be. But Senate condemnation by itself was not
capable of destroying Smith Brookhart's political career.
Iowans returned him to the Senate in 1926, and only their
repudiation in 1932 cut short his colorful senatorial career. The
dissenter in the Senate, as the case of Smith W. Brookhart
indicates, may disregard Senate norms and, on occasion. Sen-
ate sanctions, if still fulfilling the needs and desires of the
constituency back home.
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